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Efficiency, Equality and Labelling: An Experimental Investigation 
of Focal Points in Explicit Bargaining 
By ANDREA ISONI, ANDERS POULSEN, ROBERT SUGDEN AND KEI TSUTSUI* 
We investigate Schelling’s hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels 
(‘cues’) can influence the outcomes of bargaining games with 
communication.  In our experimental games, players negotiate over 
the division of a surplus by claiming valuable objects that have 
payoff-irrelevant spatial locations.  Negotiation occurs in continuous 
time, constrained by a deadline.  In some games, spatial cues are 
opposed to principles of equality or efficiency.  We find a strong 
tendency for players to agree on efficient and minimally unequal 
payoff divisions, even if spatial cues suggest otherwise.  But if there 
are two such divisions, cues are often used to select between them, 
inducing distributional effects. 
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In The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling (1960: 53, 67–74) proposes the 
hypothesis that the outcomes of bargaining problems can be systematically 
influenced by ‘incidental details’ or (as they would now be called) properties of 
framing or labelling.  These labelling properties or cues have no direct relationship 
to payoffs and are not represented in standard game-theoretic models, but they 
nevertheless provide a means by which players can coordinate their expectations.  
Although much of his theoretical analysis and all of his informal experiments are 
concerned with simultaneous-move games without communication, Schelling 
claims that this hypothesis applies to ‘explicit bargaining with full communication 
and enforcement’.  He acknowledges that communication provides mechanisms for 
coordination that are not present in his simple experiments, but still argues that 
framing properties can remain significant in explicit bargaining.  Most subsequent 
bargaining theory has not used this idea; but if real-world bargaining is substantially 
affected by payoff-irrelevant cues, a satisfactory theory of bargaining needs to take 
account of that fact.  Our paper reports experimental tests of Schelling’s hypothesis 
in a range of different bargaining games. 
To date, there has been surprisingly little experimental investigation of the role 
of payoff-irrelevant cues in explicit bargaining games.1  It is now well established 
that equilibrium selection in pure coordination games is strongly influenced by how 
strategies are labelled, and that players of these games often achieve high degrees 
of coordination by making use of concepts of salience (e.g. Judith Mehta, Chris 
Starmer, and Robert Sugden 1994; Michael Bacharach and Michele Bernasconi, 
1997; Nicholas Bardsley et al., 2010).  For games in which the players have a 
common interest in coordinating but have conflicting preferences between 
equilibria, the evidence is more mixed.  Investigating matching games (that is, 
games in which each player sees the same set of labels and chooses one of them, 
with the aim of making the same choice as her co-player(s)), Vincent P. Crawford, 
 
1
 Following Schelling, we distinguish between ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’ bargaining.  In explicit bargaining problems, the 
players have access to a rich message space, can communicate with one another in real time, and are able to reach binding 
agreements.  In tacit bargaining problems, the players choose their strategies simultaneously without prior communication.  
Explicit bargaining problems can be modelled either as extensive-form non-cooperative games or as cooperative games; tacit 
bargaining problems are modelled as normal-form non-cooperative games.  
Uri Gneezy, and Yuval Rottenstreich (2008) find a strong tendency for coordination 
on salient labels if the players’ interests are fully aligned, but that these effects 
sometimes disappear when that alignment is less than perfect.  In contrast, when 
mixed-motive games are framed as problems of tacit bargaining over the division 
of a stock of value, payoff-irrelevant cues have been found to have strong effects 
(Andrea Isoni et al., 2013).  But it is still an open question whether conclusions 
about the role of payoff-irrelevant cues in tacit bargaining extend to explicit 
bargaining. 
In a tacit bargaining game, the players have only one chance to reach agreement.  
By contrast, when bargainers can communicate with one another and make offers 
and counter-offers, additional mechanisms for the coordination of expectations are 
available, and payoff-based principles such as efficiency and equality might have 
more influence.  Joseph Farrell’s (1987) analysis of cheap talk shows that, for 
games with a Battle of the Sexes structure, pre-play communication can facilitate 
agreement on one of the two pure-strategy equilibria; the symmetry between the 
two players is broken by their probabilistic choice of messages in the symmetric 
mixed-strategy equilibrium, rather than by asymmetric cues.2  These considerations 
might seem to support the intuition that payoff-irrelevant cues lose their power 
when bargaining is explicit.  
However, Schelling offers a backward-induction argument against that intuition.  
This argument applies to bargaining that takes place over a finite interval of time, 
ending at a fixed deadline or ‘midnight bell’.  Because of the deadline, a ‘perfectly 
move-symmetrical bargaining game’ must have a final round of simultaneous play.  
Thus, a game with communication ‘necessarily gives way, at some definite 
penultimate moment, to a tacit (non-cooperative) bargaining game.’  Schelling then 
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 Tore Ellingsen and Robert Östling (2010) offer an alternative model of the role of communication in coordinating 
expectations. This model uses level-k theory and assumes that, if otherwise indifferent between strategies, players prefer to 
send honest messages. 
argues: ‘Each player must be assumed to know this and may, if he wishes, by simply 
avoiding overt agreement, elect to play the tacit game instead’ (1960: 267–272, 
italics in original).  If it is common knowledge that the tacit game, if reached, will 
be resolved in a particular way, then neither player will agree to an inferior payoff 
in the preceding negotiation.  So if it is common knowledge that tacit bargaining 
problems are resolved by the use of payoff-irrelevant cues, explicit communication 
may be redundant.   
Our experiments are designed to test the robustness of Schelling’s hypothesis in 
a range of cheap-talk settings in which payoff-irrelevant cues sometimes support 
and sometimes oppose efficiency and equality.  More precisely, we test whether, in 
the presence of a variety of trade-offs between efficiency and equality, the existence 
of a payoff-irrelevant cue that suggests a particular solution to a bargaining problem 
tends to shift the actual outcome in the direction of that solution.   
It is important to understand what we mean when we say that some feature of a 
game is payoff-irrelevant.  In game theory, players are assumed to have common 
knowledge of the payoffs that would result from each possible profile of strategies.  
A payoff-irrelevant feature provides no additional information about the payoffs 
that are associated with given strategy profiles.  However, it may influence players’ 
strategy choices (and hence the actual payoffs they derive from playing the game).  
In a game with two or more equilibria, a payoff-irrelevant feature may make one 
equilibrium particularly salient, thus suggesting a solution to the problem of 
equilibrium selection.  A commonly recognized solution to such a problem 
(whether suggested by payoff-irrelevant or payoff-based features of the game) is a 
focal point. 
If an experimental test of Schelling’s hypothesis is to be adequately controlled, 
the cues to be investigated must be payoff-irrelevant, not only with respect to 
traditional game-theoretic assumptions about players’ utility functions, but also 
with respect to other recognized theories of utility.  In particular, since subjects 
might have preferences for equality in experimental earnings, as proposed by Ernst 
Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999) and Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000), those 
cues should not provide information about the distribution of material payoffs 
between subjects for given strategy profiles – even if that information is irrelevant 
from the perspective of axiomatic bargaining theory under the assumption of self-
interest.  Thus, the design developed by Alvin E. Roth and Michael W.K. Malouf 
(1979) and by Roth and J. Keith Murnighan (1982), which investigates the effects 
on the outcomes of explicit bargaining games of varying information about the 
distribution of material payoffs, would not be suitable for our purposes.  Nor should 
the cues to be investigated provide information about the players that might suggest 
differences in their moral entitlements to rewards.  Thus, it would not be appropriate 
for us to use a design such as that of Simon Gächter and Arno Riedl (2005), which 
tests whether bargaining outcomes are influenced by players’ perceptions of ‘moral 
property rights’, induced by relative performance in a general knowledge quiz.  We 
need an experimental environment in which the cues that discriminate between 
alternative bargaining outcomes are perceived by the players only as a device for 
selecting between equilibria, and not as a source of information about the subjective 
values of those equilibria.  Our experiment is designed so that the relevant cues 
meet this requirement.  
Our main findings are the following.  Communication is highly effective in 
coordinating players’ expectations.  Across all games, we find a strong tendency 
for players to settle on the least unequal of the efficient payoff divisions, whether 
or not that division is suggested by payoff-irrelevant cues.  But when no equal and 
efficient division is feasible, those cues often influence which of the least unequal 
divisions is selected, and hence which player gets the larger payoff.  
We begin by explaining the principal features of our design (in Section I) and by 
setting out formal hypotheses, in the spirit of Schelling’s analysis, that this design 
can test (Section II).  We then describe the details of the main treatment used in the 
experiment (Section III) and report the results of our hypothesis tests (Section IV).  
Using a more inductive approach, we investigate the dynamics of bargaining and 
various other aspects of the bargaining process (Section V).  We briefly describe a 
control treatment which tests the robustness of our method of representing the 
absence of salient payoff-irrelevant cues (Section VI).  Finally, we draw general 
conclusions (Sections VII and VIII). 
I. The Bargaining Table Design 
Our experimental design was chosen with the following considerations in mind.  
We wanted a bargaining protocol that had the ‘feel’ of a bargaining problem to the 
subjects who engaged in it.  We wanted to allow bargainers to communicate with 
one another simply and freely, up to a fixed deadline, and to be able to make binding 
agreements during this period.  We wanted to be able to introduce cues that were 
clearly payoff-irrelevant and yet would be perceived as a natural part of the 
bargaining problem, rather than merely as extraneous labels.  And we wanted to 
use cues that were known to work as focal points in tacit bargaining and pure 
coordination games, so that if we were to find that those cues were ineffective in 
our explicit bargaining games, that finding could not be attributed to the cues being 
insufficiently salient. 
Figure 1 shows the displays used in the 30 bargaining games that featured in our 
main treatment, labelled G1 to G30.  Each game used a bargaining table format, 
similar to that used by Isoni et al. (2013) to investigate tacit bargaining.  Each 
bargaining table was a 9×9 grid on which were superimposed two colored squares, 
representing the players’ respective ‘bases’, and a number of ‘discs’.  On each disc 
there was a number, denoting its money value (in UK pounds).  The players 
communicated anonymously with one another through computer terminals.  Each 
player’s screen showed the bargaining table, rotated so that her own base appeared 
at the bottom.  On the screen, players were labelled as ‘you’ (with a red base) and 
‘other’ (with a grey base) so that there was no commonly-known asymmetry 
between their descriptions.  (For purposes of exposition, we will refer to the player 
whose base is on the left in Figure 1 as L, and the player on the right as R.)  The 
players were invited to negotiate an agreement on how to divide the discs between 
them.  The full text of the instructions is reproduced in the Online Appendix.3 
[Figure 1 near here] 
Negotiation took place continuously in real time, for a maximum of 90 seconds.  
At any time in this 90s interval, either player could ‘claim’ any disc by clicking on 
it with her mouse; any claim could be cancelled at any time by a further click.  Each 
player could claim as many discs as she wished.  Discs could be claimed again after 
claims had been cancelled.  Each player’s screen continuously showed both 
players’ current claims.  Discs on which there were no current claims were shown 
in white.  On each player’s screen, the discs she claimed turned red and were 
connected to her base by a red line; the discs claimed by the other player turned 
grey and were connected to the other person’s base by a grey line.  When a disc 
was claimed by both players, it turned yellow and started to blink, while still 
connected to both bases by colored lines. 
At any time, either player could report that she was willing to agree to the claims 
currently made by her and her co-player.  This was done by ticking an ‘accept box’.  
Throughout the negotiation time, each player could see both her own box and her 
co-player’s.  An ‘accept’ tick could be cancelled at any time prior to an actual 
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 The displays in Figure 1 show the bargaining tables before any rotation was applied.  The Figure contains the following 
features that were not part of the displays seen by participants.  First, columns are numbered from –4 to 4 from left to right, 
and rows are numbered from –4 to 4 from top to bottom.  Second, in each game discs are labelled from d1 to dn, where n is 
the number of discs in the game.  These features are included to facilitate the reading of the datasets (insert web address).  
Third, the bases are labelled ‘L’ and ‘R’ rather than ‘you’ and ‘other’.  Finally, disc values are shown with the omission of 
the ‘£’ symbol (which was displayed in the experiment). 
agreement, and was automatically cancelled if either player changed her claims.  
An agreement was sealed if and when there was a tick in each player’s accept box.  
At this stage, if any disc was claimed by both players, each player’s payoff from 
the game was zero; otherwise, each player’s payoff was the total value of the discs 
she had claimed.  If no agreement had been reached after 90s, players’ payoffs were 
calculated as if they had agreed to the set of claims that was current when the time 
allowed for bargaining expired.  This design feature allows co-players to maintain 
conflicting claims right up to the final seconds of the game, while keeping open the 
possibility of achieving positive payoffs through a very late change of claims by 
one player.  Such a concession would typically require only a few mouse clicks.  
Notice also that this bargaining protocol allows players to agree to leave some discs 
unclaimed by either of them, or to agree that both payoffs be zero.4  (A screenshot 
of the bargaining table is shown in the online appendix.) 
There are some significant differences between our bargaining protocol and those 
used by other researchers such as Roth and Murnighan (1982), Robert Forsythe, 
John Kennan, and Barry Sopher (1991), and Gächter and Riedl (2005).5  One 
difference is that the mechanism for making claims in our design provides a 
structured language for non-binding communication between the players, prior to 
their using the agreement mechanism.  Because these ‘messages’ are sent by mouse 
clicks and are immediately displayed on players’ screens in an intuitive way, they 
can be exchanged very quickly.  A more important difference is that, in our 
protocol, players make claims on specific objects rather than proposing 
 
4
 Although the mechanisms of ‘claiming’ and ‘accepting’ do not provide a direct way of proposing that some discs should 
be claimed by neither player, there are indirect ways for a player to communicate that she wants an equal but inefficient 
agreement (for example, by claiming discs compatible with such an agreement and refusing to accept any unequal proposal 
from her co-player). 
5
 In these designs, players submit proposals about how the available surplus should be divided; the sender of a proposal 
is committed to it if the other player accepts it.  Players are also able to send free-form written messages, subject to certain 
constraints which require messages to be checked by an experimenter before being transmitted, thus requiring relatively long 
negotiation periods (ten minutes in Forsythe et al.’s, twelve minutes in Roth and Murnighan’s, fifteen minutes in Gächter 
and Riedl’s).  
distributions of the total available payoff.  One consequence of this feature is that a 
given profile of payoffs may be consistent with more than one set of claims, and so 
may set a coordination problem for two players who both want to arrive at those 
payoffs.6  (In G1, for example, there are two distinct sets of claims which imply 
that each player receives £5.)  However, given the communication opportunities 
provided by our protocol, one might expect such coordination problems to be easily 
solved.  For our purposes, the principal advantage of linking claims with objects is 
that it allows us to use the spatial layout of discs as an intuitively natural cue. 
We submit that these cues are payoff-irrelevant in the sense that is required for 
tests of Schelling’s hypothesis.  We recognize that the layout of discs on the table 
could prompt mental associations with real-world situations in which there are 
transport costs that increase with distance, or in which taking closer rather than 
more distant objects is an apparently natural heuristic.  But mental associations such 
as these are exactly what Schelling’s theory is about.  Discussing the role of focal 
points in bargaining, Schelling says that what is perceived as the ‘obvious’ outcome 
depends ‘on what analogies or precedents the definition of the bargaining issue calls 
to mind’, and that the mechanism that lies behind focality is ‘the power of 
suggestion’ (1960, 69, 73, italics in original).  From experiments on matching 
games, it is known that the labels that are focal are often those that are perceived as 
‘favorites’ – in other words, that prompt mental associations with subjective value 
(Bardsley et al., 2010).  In the classic matching game of choosing a meeting place 
in New York City, the focality of Grand Central Station for Schelling’s respondents 
surely has something to do with associations of ideas with travel costs: for residents 
of New Haven, Connecticut in the 1950s, travelling to New York City by train, 
Grand Central Station was presumably a cost-minimizing meeting place.  It seems 
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 Dorothea K. Herreiner and Clemens Puppe (2010) use a bargaining protocol in which players propose divisions of a set 
of specific objects (described as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’), but in which given sets of objects can have different values for the 
two players.  Values are assigned so that each division of the objects induces a unique payoff profile. 
unavoidable that, in any fair test of Schelling’s theory, payoff-irrelevant cues will 
have associations with real-world concepts of value, or with real-world precedents 
or habits.  What is required (and our design achieves) is that the experiment uses 
labels that are payoff-irrelevant, that is, they do not provide information about the 
actual payoffs of the game that subjects play, and that this fact is transparent. 
In choosing the spatial layouts of discs for our bargaining games, our working 
assumption was that players would classify locations on the table as ‘closer to my 
base’, ‘closer to the other player’s base’, and ‘equidistant from the bases’ (i.e. in 
the central column).  Thus, in any given game, a natural association of closeness 
suggests that each player should claim the discs that are closer to his base.  To the 
extent that these suggestions are acted on, a player has an advantage relative to her 
co-player if the discs on her side of the table have a higher total money value than 
discs on the other player’s side.  In such a case, we will say that the first player is 
favored. 
This assumption is supported by evidence from matching games and tacit 
bargaining games.  Mehta et al. (1994) investigate a type of matching game in 
which two players each see the same diagram of a grid, similar to our bargaining 
tables, on which two squares and a number of circles are located.  The players’ 
problem is to coordinate on an assignment of circles to squares (each circle being 
assigned to exactly one square).  Mehta et al. find high rates of coordination in these 
games, and a strong tendency for players to assign each circle to the square (if there 
is one) to which it is closer.  Isoni et al. (2013) find that, when tacit bargaining 
games are displayed as bargaining tables, spatial cues act as powerful focal points; 
players are much more likely to claim discs at their own side of the table than discs 
at the other side, even when the layout of discs favors one player relative to the 
other. 
In the light of this evidence, it is reasonable to expect that when explicit 
bargaining games are presented as bargaining tables, players will recognize (but 
not necessarily act on) spatial cues based on the relation of closeness between discs 
and bases.  In any game in which there is at least one disc at each player’s side of 
the table, we will say that the spatial cues pick out the solution in which each player 
takes the discs at her side of the table, and no others.  Games in which all the discs 
are in the central column (spatially neutral games) will be used as controls.7  
In G4, for example, the spatial cues pick out the solution in which player L takes 
the £6 disc and player R takes the £5 disc.  Notice that spatial cues may pick out 
solutions in which some discs are assigned to neither player.  For example, the 
spatial cues of G21 pick out the solution in which each player takes the £5 disc on 
her own side of the table, leaving the £1 disc in the central column unclaimed.  The 
idea that cues can work in this way is consistent with Schelling’s (1960: 295–297) 
discussion of games in which payoff-dominated equilibria are focal.  It should also 
be remembered that if players have preferences for equality in money earnings, a 
solution that achieves equality by leaving some discs unclaimed can be non-
dominated in utility. 
Our objective is to investigate how far, and under what conditions, actual 
bargaining outcomes are skewed towards those solutions that are picked out by 
spatial cues.  Such an investigation needs to take account of payoff-based factors 
that might complement or oppose spatial cues.  Most theories of bargaining imply 
that bargaining outcomes are influenced by principles of efficiency and equality.  
We therefore consider how those principles apply to our games. 
Consider any bargaining table game with players L and R.  If we abstract from 
spatial properties, the game is defined by a collection D of disc values.  For 
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 Notice that it is an intrinsic property of a bargaining table game that each disc has a distinct location.  For this reason, 
it is impossible to remove every spatial cue from the game.  But for the purposes of our tests of Schelling’s hypotheses, what 
matters is that the most salient spatial cues are those defined by the closeness relation embedded in our design, and that these 
cues are absent from the games that are used as controls.  As shown by Isoni et al. (2013), games in which all discs are 
equidistant from the two bases have much weaker spatial cues than games in which discs are split between the two halves of 
the table.  An alternative form of control, in which spatial neutrality is defined by the absence of bases, will be considered in 
Section VI.   
example, G1 and G2 are both defined by D = {5, 5}.8  The specification of D 
determines which combinations of payoffs are feasible.  We define an allocation 
(wL, wR) as a pair of payoffs to L and R respectively.  Notice that an allocation is 
defined in terms of payoffs; when we need to refer to players’ final claims on the 
discs themselves, defined by their spatial locations, we will use the term 
assignment.  An allocation is feasible if it would result from some assignment of 
discs to players that is consistent with the rules of the game.  (Thus, if D = {5, 5}, 
the set of feasible allocations is {(0, 0), (0, 5), (0, 10), (5, 0), (5, 5), (10, 0)}.) 
Now consider any feasible allocation (wL, wR) in a game in which the total value 
of the discs is v.  The efficiency of this allocation is (wL + wR)/v; we will say the 
allocation is efficient if (wL + wR)/v = 1, and inefficient otherwise.  The allocation 
is equal if wL = wR.  Its worse consequence is min(wL, wR).  It is least-unequal 
efficient (LUE) if it is efficient and if no efficient allocation has a strictly greater 
worse consequence.  It is least-inefficient equal (LIE) if it is equal and if no equal 
allocation gives greater payoffs to both players.  It is equal and efficient (EE) if it 
is both LUE and LIE.  Intuition suggests that, in the absence of payoff-irrelevant 
cues, LUE and LIE allocations are particularly likely to be perceived as focal.  The 
games used in our experiment were chosen to represent different relationships 
between the allocation picked out by spatial cues (the SC allocation) and the LUE 
and LIE allocations. 
Our bargaining table design imposes certain constraints on the sets of feasible 
allocations that can be represented, and hence on the efficiency/equality trade-offs 
that can be investigated.  One constraint is that, for any payoffs x and y, (x, y) is 
feasible if and only if (y, x) is feasible: the payoff opportunities available to the 
players are always symmetrical.  A second constraint is that if the LIE allocation is 
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 A ‘collection’, unlike a set, can contain two or more identical items.  Thus, for example, {5, 5} and {5} are distinct 
collections. 
inefficient, it must be weakly dominated by each of the LUE allocations.  For 
example, consider a game with v = 11 in which (4, 4) is LIE.  Then there must be 
one or more discs worth 3 in total that are ‘left on the table’ if (4, 4) is reached, 
which implies that (7, 4) and (4, 7) are also feasible.  A third constraint is that if (x, 
y) and (y, x) are LUE with x > 2y, there must be a disc worth exactly x which is left 
on the table in any equal allocation, and so the LIE payoff to each player cannot be 
greater than y/2 (with the implication that the LIE allocation is strictly dominated 
by the LUE allocations).9  Subject to these constraints, we investigate the effects of 
spatial cues in relation to a range of different efficiency/equality trade-offs. 
II. Hypotheses  
Table 1 summarizes the 30 games used in the main treatment, classifying them 
in relation to the hypotheses that are to be tested. 
[Table 1 near here] 
In this Table, and in the rest of the paper, we use the following compact notation 
to describe bargaining table games.  For any given game, we list its disc values (in 
UK pounds).  Two vertical lines are added to the list to show the main features of 
the spatial layout.  Discs located in the left (right) columns of the bargaining table 
are listed to the left (right) of both vertical lines; discs in the central column are 
listed between the vertical lines.  So, for example, G1 = |5,5| is a game in which 
there are two discs worth £5 each, both located in the central column.  G18 = 2,1| 
|4, 4 is a game in which there are four discs, d1 and d2 on the left, worth £2 and £1 
 
9
 Suppose (x, y) and (y, x) are LUE with x > 2y.  First, suppose there is no disc worth exactly x.  Then in any (x, y) 
allocation, player L must be assigned at least two discs, and the lowest-valued of these discs must be worth no more than x/2.  
But if this disc is transferred from L to R, the resulting (efficient) allocation is less unequal than (x, y), contradicting the 
assumption that (x, y) is LUE.  So there must be a disc worth exactly x.  Since this disc is worth more than all the others 
combined, it must be left on the table in an equal allocation. 
respectively, and d3 and d4 on the right, both worth £4; in this game R is favored.  
G12 = 2,1,2|1|2,2,1 is a game in which there are seven discs, three on the left, worth 
£2, £1 and £2, one in the central column, worth £1, and three on the right, worth 
£2, £2 and £1. 
Each row of Table 1 refers to a set of games that use a common disc collection, 
and therefore differ only in terms of the spatial layout of the discs.  The entry in the 
first column of each row identifies the relevant disc collection.  The entries in the 
second and third columns record the LUE and LIE allocations for this set of games.  
For each disc collection, there is one spatially neutral game, identified in the fourth 
column, and one or more games with spatial cues.  The latter games are identified 
in the remaining four columns, classified according to the allocations that are 
picked out by those cues.  Each of these games allows us to test some hypothesis 
about the role of spatial cues in explicit bargaining.  These hypotheses are 
concerned with average or aggregate outcomes of given bargaining table games 
that are faced by many pairs of players.  
The ‘EE’ column identifies games in which an EE allocation is picked out by 
spatial cues.  These games allow us to test our background assumption that the 
spatial relation between discs and bases is perceived as salient.  Because of the 
symmetry embedded in our design, any feasible EE allocation can be arrived at by 
at least two (and sometimes many more) different assignments of discs to players.  
If spatial cues were salient, one would expect the assignments suggested by those 
cues to be chosen more frequently than other assignments that implied the same 
allocations. This can be tested most cleanly in games in which payoff-based criteria 
make one allocation uniquely focal, and spatial cues pick out one particular 
assignment consistent with that allocation.  We therefore test the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  In any bargaining table game in which there is an EE allocation 
picked out by spatial cues, the disc assignment suggested by those cues occurs 
more frequently than any other assignment that implies the same allocation. 
The ‘LUE, not equal’ and ‘efficient, not LUE’ columns of Table 1 respectively 
identify two types of game in which the spatial cues pick out unequal but efficient 
allocations.  In games of the first type, there are two LUE allocations, differing 
according to which player gets the higher payoff, and the spatial cues pick out one 
of these allocations.  These games span a range of different trade-offs between 
efficiency and equality.  The difference between the two players’ LUE payoffs 
varies from £1 in G4, G13, G17 and G20 to £5 in G6 and G29.  In G4 and G6, the 
only equal allocation is that in which both players receive nothing.  In G17, the LIE 
allocation gives positive payoffs but is strictly dominated by the LUE allocations.  
In G13, G23, G26 and G29, the LIE allocation is only weakly dominated by the 
LUE allocations, making the trade-off as favorable as possible to equality.  Recall 
that if (x, y) is an LUE allocation and if x > 2y, the LIE allocation is strictly 
dominated by the LUE allocations.  Thus, when the dominance is only weak, the 
x:y ratio cannot be greater than 2:1.  This ratio ranges from 6:5 in G13 to the 
maximum value of 2:1 in G29.  The ‘efficient, not LUE’ column identifies games 
in which the spatial cues pick out an efficient allocation that is more than minimally 
unequal. 
For games in which spatial cues pick out unequal but efficient allocations, we test 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  In any bargaining table game in which spatial cues pick out an 
unequal but efficient allocation, payoffs are higher for favored players than for 
unfavored players. 
This hypothesis encapsulates a key difference between Schelling’s analysis of 
explicit bargaining and analyses that take no account of payoff-irrelevant cues.  
Whatever the number and value of discs on the table, the only asymmetries between 
the players are the result of spatial cues.  (Recall that the players have not been 
given any commonly-known labels, and that each player is free to claim any disc.)  
Thus, if play is not influenced by spatial cues, there can be no systematic difference 
between the payoffs of favored and unfavored players.  In contrast, it is fundamental 
to Schelling’s analysis that payoff-irrelevant cues can confer a bargaining 
advantage on one player relative to another. 
One might think that Schelling’s approach also implies that, when spatial cues 
pick out an LUE allocation, bargaining outcomes will tend to be more efficient than 
in the corresponding spatially neutral game.  However, the role of cues in explicit 
bargaining can be modelled in ways that imply Hypothesis 2 while not implying 
that the presence of cues increases efficiency.  A simple model of this kind, based 
on the asymmetric Hawk–Dove game (John Maynard Smith and Geoffrey Parker, 
1976; Sugden, 2004), is presented in the Online Appendix.  The essential idea 
behind the model is that players may be spatially aware or spatially blind.  Spatially 
blind players follow strategies that are independent of cues.  Such players are of 
two types – tough bargainers (‘hawks’) and soft bargainers (‘doves’).  Spatially 
aware players act as hawks when they are favored and as doves when they are not.  
Whatever the mix of these three types, provided that there are at least some spatially 
aware players, average payoffs are strictly higher for favored than for unfavored 
players.  For some parameter values, however, the interplay of the two types 
induces less agreement and hence lower efficiency in games with spatial cues than 
in spatially neutral games.   
The final column of Table 1 identifies games in which spatial cues pick out an 
allocation that is LIE (with nonzero payoffs) but inefficient.  The value of the discs 
that must be left unclaimed in order to achieve this allocation varies from £1 in G12 
and G21 to £5 in G30.  For these games, we test the hypothesis that bargaining 
outcomes are skewed in the direction of equality.  In this case, the predicted effect 
of cues is symmetrical with respect to the players, and so ‘skew’ has to be defined 
by reference to spatially neutral games.  Our final hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 3:  Let G be any bargaining table game in which the LIE allocation 
is inefficient, gives nonzero payoffs, and is picked out by spatial cues.  Let G 
be a spatially neutral game with the same disc collection as G.  The probability 
that the outcome is the LIE allocation is higher for G than for G. 
III. Implementation of the Experiment   
The main treatment was first run as a series of sessions in which subjects faced 
games G1–G18, which we call Set I.  In the light of the results from those games, 
we extended the study to a wider class of games with a greater variety of trade-offs 
between efficiency and equality.  We ran a further set of sessions in which subjects 
faced G19–G30 and (as a consistency check) G1–G6, making up Set II.    
Each subject played the relevant eighteen games in random order, not always 
with the same opponent, taking the favored role in some games and the unfavored 
role in others.10  Each participant was anonymously assigned to a matching group 
of four subjects, and for each game her opponent was chosen from the other three 
people in her group.  This was known to the subject, but the matching sequence 
was varied so that subjects did not know which member of their group was their 
co-player in any given game.  Given the number of games to be played, it was 
infeasible to match subjects in a way that would allow each pair in any given game 
to be treated as an independent observation.  Thus, to allow clean statistical tests 
with an acceptable degree of power, it was necessary to match subjects within small 
fixed groups and to use matching groups as the units of observation.  Partner 
 
10
 For each of the games in which spatial cues favor one of the players, which player was favored was determined 
randomly.  Given our matching protocol (see below), it would not have been possible for individual subjects to be assigned 
the same role for all of these games. 
matching (i.e. a group size of two) would have introduced the possibility that pairs 
might try to equalize average payoffs over the eighteen games, for example by 
alternating which player would get the larger share of the surplus.  We judged that, 
with a group size of four and with no opportunities for free-form communication, 
group-level cooperation across games would be difficult to sustain.  However, it is 
possible that the use of matching groups could have induced subjects to bargain 
less aggressively than they would have done in one-shot games.  
We used a variant of the random lottery incentive system.  Each subject was paid 
his payoffs in two of the eighteen games, chosen at random by the computer.  This 
selection procedure was subject to the constraints that both players in a pair were 
paid for the same game and that each player in a matching group appeared in two 
of the selected pairs. 
The main treatment was run in June 2010 (for Set I) and November 2012 (for Set 
II) at the CBESS Experimental Laboratory at the University of East Anglia.  
Participants were recruited from the general student population using the ORSEE 
system (Ben Greiner, 2004), excluding individuals who participated in previous 
bargaining table experiments.  There were 144 subjects in the Set I sessions and 
168 in the Set II sessions; no one participated in both.  The bargaining protocol was 
implemented using z-Tree (Urs Fischbacher, 2007).  Subjects’ understanding of this 
protocol and other key aspects of the experiment was checked using a computerized 
questionnaire (which can be found in the Online Appendix).  Sessions lasted 
between sixty and eighty minutes; earnings ranged between £5 and £25 with an 
average of £15.12, including a £5 show-up fee. 
IV. Results: Bargaining Outcomes 
The outcomes of bargaining in the main treatment are summarized in Tables 2a 
(for Set I) and 2b (for Set II).  
[Tables 2a and 2b near here] 
In each Table, there is a row for each game in the relevant set.  The horizontal 
lines separate groups of games that have a common disc collection.  The first game 
in each of these groups is spatially neutral; the others have various kinds of spatial 
cues.   
The first column describes the game in our compact notation.  The second column 
reports average efficiency – that is, the average value of (wL + wR)/v achieved by 
the 72 player pairs facing Set I or the 84 player pairs facing Set II.  The following 
columns report the percentage of pairs whose payoffs constituted: an efficient 
allocation (column 3), an equal allocation with nonzero payoffs (column 4),11 and 
an LUE allocation (column 5).  For games with spatial cues, column 6 reports the 
percentage of pairs whose payoffs constituted the SC allocation.  Since this 
allocation is implied by two or more different assignments of discs to players, the 
percentage of pairs in which each player’s final claims were exactly the discs 
assigned to her by the spatial cues – the SC claims – is shown in parentheses.  
Column 7 reports the percentage of pairs whose interactions12 ended with the 
allocation (0, 0).  The percentage of cases in which this was the result of a sealed 
agreement is shown in parentheses.  The final column reports an index of 
normalized payoff asymmetry (NPA).  This is defined as (wF – wU)/(wF*– wU*) 
where wF and wU are the average payoffs to favored and unfavored players 
respectively, and wF* and wU* are the payoffs implied by the SC allocation.  Thus, 
normalized payoff asymmetry is equal to one if all pairs settle on the SC allocation, 
 
11
 In every case in which a pair achieved an equal allocation with nonzero payoffs, that allocation was also LIE.  We 
therefore do not report LIE outcomes separately. 
12
 We use the term ‘interaction’ to refer to the course of play in a particular game (e.g. G1, G2, etc.) faced by a particular 
pair of players. 
and has an expected value of zero if players’ behavior is unaffected by spatial cues.  
The asterisks against entries in this column will be explained later. 
It is immediately obvious from a comparison of the two Tables that, in each game 
that was common to Sets I and II, behavior was very similar in the two cases.13  
Thus, although our formal hypothesis tests will be carried out separately for the two 
sets, it is reasonable to interpret the results as if they had been generated by two 
samples from the same subject pool.  
A.  Spatially Neutral Games 
We begin by looking at the outcome of bargaining in spatially neutral games.  
These provide a natural benchmark from which to assess the effect of payoff-
irrelevant cues in other games. 
In the games in which an EE allocation was feasible (i.e. G1 and G7), most pairs 
agreed on equal and efficient assignments of discs.  Average efficiency in these 
games was very high, varying from 98.3 to 100 per cent.  Clearly, when trade-offs 
do not have to be made between equality and efficiency, the type of communication 
allowed by our bargaining protocol enables players to solve the problem of 
coordinating their disc claims.  For this, spatial cues are not needed. 
In the games in which an EE allocation was not feasible, average efficiency was 
negatively related to the degree of inequality of the LUE allocations.  When the 
LUE allocations were (5, 6) and (6, 5), average efficiency varied from 95.8 to 98.4 
per cent.  Its lowest value was 78.2 per cent in G5 in Set II, where the LUE 
allocations were (3, 8) and (8, 3).  But in all games, a large majority of interactions 
ended with LUE allocations, even when equal allocations with nonzero payoffs 
 
13
 For each of these games, we test the null hypothesis that the distributions of earnings do not differ between the Set I 
and Set II sessions by comparing the group-level averages with two-tail Mann-Whitney tests.  For games with spatial cues, 
we conduct similar tests on the earnings of favored and unfavored players.  The hypothesis is never rejected.  See the Online 
Appendix for details. 
were feasible.  In G25, for example, the LUE allocations were (4, 7) and (7, 4), 
while (4, 4) was also feasible; 66 out of 84 pairs (78.6 percent) settled on one of the 
LUE allocations, while only six (7.1 percent) settled on (4, 4).  The overall picture 
is clear: in the absence of spatial cues, there was a very strong tendency for players 
to agree on LUE allocations. 
When the LUE allocations were (5, 6) and (6, 5), the percentage of interactions 
ending with zero payoffs to both players ranged from 1.4 to 4.2.  When the LUE 
allocations were more unequal than this, that percentage ranged from 8.3 to 21.3.  
These figures are broadly in line with the disagreement rates found in other 
experimental investigations of unstructured bargaining.14  It is difficult to make 
meaningful comparisons across experiments with very different designs and payoff 
parameters, but our bargaining protocol does not seem significantly more or less 
likely to induce agreement than those that have been used by other researchers.   
B.  Games in which Spatial Cues Pick Out Equal and Efficient Allocations 
There are two games, G2 and G8, in which spatial cues pick out EE allocations.  
These games allow tests of Hypothesis 1.  Given our findings for the corresponding 
spatially neutral games, it is not surprising that in G2 and G8, most pairs agreed on 
equal and efficient allocations.  But we can ask whether, in reaching those 
allocations, players made use of spatial cues. 
To test Hypothesis 1, we consider the number of pairs whose final claims were 
exactly those suggested by the spatial cues (corresponding with the entry in 
parentheses in column 6 of Table 2a or 2b for the relevant game) as a proportion of 
 
14
 For example, Roth and Murnighan (1982, Table IV) find a disagreement rate of 16.7 per cent when (as in our 
experiment) players’ payoffs are common knowledge.  Forsythe, Kennan, and Sopher (1991, Table 2) investigate bargaining 
games with imperfect information.  In the treatment (‘IV’) in which imperfect information is least likely to impede agreement, 
the disagreement rate is 9.9 per cent.  Gächter and Riedl (2005, Table 3) find an average disagreement rate of 18.2 per cent 
in an experiment in which an unequal allocation is framed as respecting ‘moral property rights’.  Herreiner and Puppe (2010, 
Table 6) find an average disagreement rate of 4.7 per cent in games with ‘cardinal’ payoffs; in the game with the most severe 
efficiency/equality trade-off (‘R3’), the rate is 10.4 per cent.  
the number of pairs who achieved the SC allocation (the main entry in the same 
column).  Our null hypothesis is that players are equally likely to make any set of 
final claims with the same total value; the alternative hypothesis is that the set of 
final claims suggested by the cues (the SC claims) is made with higher probability 
than other claims with the same total value.  In G2, there are two possible ways in 
which the (5, 5) allocation can be achieved: when both players claim the disc closer 
to them, as suggested by the spatial cues, and when both claim the farther disc.  In 
Set I, 61 of the 71 pairs who settled on a (5, 5) allocation selected the SC claims.  
In Set II, this was true for 74 out of 84 pairs.  In G8, there are twelve possible ways 
in which the (5, 5) allocation can be achieved; 51 of the 63 pairs who settled on this 
allocation selected the SC claims.  In each case, the null hypothesis is decisively 
rejected in a χ2 test of goodness of fit for a binomial distribution (p < 0.0001).15  
This finding confirms our background assumption that the cues that were built into 
our experimental design would be perceived as salient by players.  
C.  Games in which Spatial Cues Pick Out Unequal LUE Allocations 
There are eight games, G4, G6, G13, G17, G20, G23, G26, and G29, in which 
spatial cues pick out one of two unequal LUE allocations.  Two of these games (G4 
and G6) appeared in both Set I and Set II.  In each of these ten cases, the level of 
average efficiency and the proportion of pairs who settled on LUE allocations were 
similar to the values observed in the corresponding spatially neutral game.  In each 
case, there is no significant difference in average group earnings between the 
spatially neutral game and the game in which spatial cues pick out one of the 
unequal LUE allocations.16 
 
15
 This test takes into account the fact that each of these games was played by two pairs in each matching group. 
16
 These comparisons are based on two-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank tests which use the matching groups as the unit of 
observation. 
 For the reasons explained in Section II, the similarity in efficiency need not be 
interpreted as evidence against Schelling’s hypothesis.  It is more important to ask 
whether, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, payoffs were higher for favored than for 
unfavored players.  For each of these ten cases, normalized payoff asymmetry is 
shown in the final column of Table 2a or 2b.  NPA is positive in eight of these 
cases.  To test for significant payoff asymmetry in the direction implied by 
Hypothesis 2, we use a one-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank test, comparing average 
payoffs to favored and unfavored players and using matching groups as the unit of 
observation.  The results of this test are shown by the asterisks in the final columns 
of the Tables.  There is significant payoff asymmetry in four cases – G4 in Set I (p 
< 0.1), G4 in Set II (p < 0.01), G17 (p < 0.01) and G26 (p < 0.05). 
These results suggest that when spatial cues pick out one of two LUE allocations, 
there is some tendency for bargaining outcomes to be skewed in the direction 
suggested by those cues, but this tendency is relatively weak. 
D.  Games in which Spatial Cues Pick Out Efficient Allocations that are not LUE 
There are four games, G9, G10, G14 and G18, in which spatial cues pick out an 
efficient allocation that is not LUE.  Given the high frequency of LUE allocations 
in the corresponding spatially neutral games, these games provide a test of the 
power of spatial cues to induce gratuitous inequality – that is, inequality beyond 
the minimum necessary for efficiency.  Efficiency levels are very similar to the 
spatially neutral games, and the distributions of earnings are not statistically 
different, with the exception of G14, in which a marginally significant decrease in 
earnings is observed (p < 0.1).  The proportion of pairs who settled on LUE 
allocations was also not significantly different.17 
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 More details on these tests can be found in the Online Appendix. 
Very few of these interactions ended with the specific allocations suggested by 
the spatial cues.  In G9 only seven pairs settled on the suggested (4, 6) allocation, 
with two pairs settling on the opposite (6, 4) allocation.  In all other cases, in which 
the suggested distributions were more unequal – (3, 7), (8, 3) and (3, 8) in G10, 
G14 and G18 respectively – none of the 72 pairs settled on the SC allocation. 
However, this does not mean that spatial cues had no distributional effects in 
these games.  Just as in the games considered in Section IV.C, we can measure NPA 
and can test Hypothesis 2.  In all four games, NPA was positive.  Payoff asymmetry 
was significant in G9 (p < 0.05), G18 (p < 0.05) and G14 (p < 0.10).  In G14 and 
G18, virtually all agreements were LUE (65 out of 66 in G14, 68 out of 69 in G18); 
the effect of spatial cues was to discriminate between the two LUE allocations to 
the advantage of the favored player.  In G9, in which an EE allocation was available, 
57 of the 69 agreements were on that allocation, but the non-EE agreements were 
skewed to the advantage of the favored player. 
These results suggest that spatial cues have little or no power to induce gratuitous 
inequality.  But they provide additional evidence that, when efficiency is 
incompatible with equality, asymmetric spatial cues can influence the distribution 
of payoffs.  
E.  Games in which Spatial Cues Pick Out Inefficient LIE Allocations 
There are six games, G12, G16, G21, G24, G27 and G30, in which spatial cues 
pick out an allocation that is LIE but not efficient.  These games allow tests of 
Hypothesis 3 – that spatial cues of this kind increase the probability that players 
settle on the LIE allocation.   
In all six games, LIE allocations (shown in column 6 of Tables 2a and 2b) were 
very infrequent.  The highest percentage of LIE allocations was 13.1 per cent in 
G24; there were no such allocations in G12 or G16.  In only one of the six games 
was the frequency of LIE allocations greater than in the corresponding spatially 
neutral game.  (This is G30, in which 9 out of 84 pairs settled on the LIE allocation.  
In G28, the corresponding spatially neutral game, the LIE allocation was achieved 
by 5 out of 84 pairs.)  Clearly, our results give no support to Hypothesis 3. 
V. Results: Bargaining Dynamics, Cross-Group Variation, and Learning 
Effects 
In this Section, we go beyond the testing of prior hypotheses about bargaining 
outcomes.  Using an inductive approach, we seek insights into the causal 
mechanisms that generated those outcomes.  Because of space constraints, we 
provide only a summary of our findings; further details are given in the Online 
Appendix. 
A.   Time Spent Reaching Agreement 
We begin by looking at the time that pairs spent in trying to reach agreement. 
For any given interaction, we define bargaining duration as the time that elapsed 
before an agreement was sealed, or as 90s if no agreement was sealed before the 
deadline.  For each game G1–G6 that appears in both Set I and Set II, there is no 
significant difference between the cumulative distributions of bargaining duration 
in the two cases.18  More surprisingly, there is very little evidence that bargaining 
duration was affected by the presence or absence of spatial cues.19   
 
18
 Between-subject comparisons between cumulative distributions of bargaining durations are based on the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test.  Since our matching protocol entails that the same individual may be part of two different pairs in the two 
games used for these comparisons, we conduct the tests on the average bargaining duration for each game computed over 
the two pairs belonging to the same group of four players.  This reduces the sample size to 36 and 42 observations for each 
comparison in Sets I and II respectively, but ensures that each observation refers to the same group of individuals.   
19
 Cross-game comparisons between cumulative distributions of bargaining durations are based on two-tail Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests.  Significant differences in bargaining duration between games with spatial cues and corresponding spatially 
neutral games were found only for G8, G21 and G26.  In all three cases, the presence of spatial cues shortened bargaining 
duration.  For each game with spatial cues, we also compare the frequency of ‘profitable agreements’ (i.e. interactions ending 
While bargaining duration is a convenient metric to use in conducting statistical 
tests, a plot of the cumulative distribution of bargaining duration does not allow us 
to see some interesting aspects of the bargaining process.  Recall that our bargaining 
protocol did not require players to tick their accept boxes in order for their payoffs 
to be determined by the claims on the table at 90s.  In fact, it was not uncommon 
for interactions to end with no sealed agreement, but with claims that gave a 
nonzero payoff to one or both players.  This was the case for 113 interactions (8.7 
per cent) in Set I and 336 interactions (22.2 per cent) in Set II.  Significantly, 
however, almost all these interactions (103 in Set I, 310 in Set II) were ones in 
which at least one player changed her claims in the final five seconds of the 
interaction.  It is natural to interpret these cases as ones in which the players had 
effectively agreed, but the change of claims that immediately preceded that 
agreement occurred so close to the deadline that the players did not have time to 
tick their accept boxes.  (This interpretation is supported by the fact that, as we will 
show later, a high proportion of sealed agreements were reached in the final 
seconds.)  Bargaining duration does not distinguish between these cases and 
interactions that ended with the players making conflicting claims. 
Since sealed agreements on (0, 0) allocations were very infrequent (see Tables 2a 
and 2b), little is lost by focusing on profitable agreements, defined as the outcomes 
of interactions in which at least one player’s payoff was nonzero.  We will say that 
such agreements were either ‘implicit’ or ‘explicit’.  A (profitable) agreement was 
explicit if it was sealed within the 90s available for bargaining, in which case the 
agreement time is the time, in seconds from the start of the interaction, when it was 
sealed.  Thus, if an interaction ended without a sealed agreement but with a positive 
payoff for at least one player, this constitutes an implicit agreement.  We arbitrarily 
 
with a positive payoff for at least one player) with that in the corresponding spatially neutral game, and we find no significant 
difference. 
assign an agreement time of 95s to implicit agreements to distinguish them from 
agreements sealed at exactly 90s. 
Figures 2a and 2b report the cumulative distributions of agreement times for Sets 
I and II respectively, averaging across games with the same disc collection.20  
Because of our conventions, the last point of each curve represents the net effect of 
implicit agreements, while the vertical distance between the last point and the 100 
per cent boundary represents the percentage of (0, 0) allocations (including the few 
cases in which such allocations resulted from sealed agreements).  
[Figure 2a and Figure 2b near here] 
Notice that, in both Figures, the graph for G1–G2 is an outlier: in these games, 
over 85 per cent of pairs sealed agreements in the first 10 seconds.  It seems that 
players recognized that, when there are only two discs and both have the same 
value, neither player can credibly hold out for anything other than the EE allocation, 
and so the problem reduces to that of coordinating on who takes which disc.  That 
most pairs were able to resolve this problem in a few seconds, even in the absence 
of spatial cues, is evidence of the transparency and flexibility of our bargaining 
protocol.  Agreement times are also relatively short for G7–G10, the other set of 
games in which an EE allocation is feasible. 
The remaining graphs all refer to games in which there are two unequal LUE 
allocations.  These graphs show several suggestive regularities. 
First, other things being equal, agreement times are longer for games in which 
LUE allocations are more unequal.  (In Figure 2a, for example, the graphs for G3–
G4, G11–G14, G15–G18, where the LUE allocations are (5, 6) and (6, 5), are 
almost everywhere above the graph for G5–G6, where the LUE allocations are (3, 
 
20
 Distributions of agreement time are very similar for games with the same disc collection (compare footnote 18). 
8) and (8, 3).)  Given that most pairs settled on LUE allocations, this effect should 
not be surprising.  When LUE allocations are unequal, agreement on one such 
allocation requires one player to concede the larger payoff to the other; the greater 
the inequality, the greater the concession that has to be made. 
Second, other things being equal, agreement times are longer for games with 
more discs.  This is as one would expect: the more discs there are, the more time 
needs to be spent making claims, and the greater the variety of messages that can 
be transmitted in the ‘language’ of claims. 
Third, and we suggest most important, all the graphs show the same three phases 
of agreement behavior, occurring in the same time intervals.  The rate at which 
agreements are made is relatively high from 0s to about 30s.  From then to about 
80s, this rate levels off, before increasing steeply in the final seconds of the 
interaction.  Similar ‘deadline effects’ have been found in other unstructured 
bargaining experiments (e.g. Alvin E. Roth et al. 1988; Uri Gneezy et al. 2003; 
Gächter and Riedl 2005, 2006), and are consistent with the backward-induction 
logic of both Schelling’s and Farrell’s models of bargaining (see Introduction).  The 
high rate of agreement in the first phase is more surprising, given that, in all phases 
of the game, most agreements were on one or other of the LUE allocations and that 
(as we will show later) failures to agree were usually the result of both players 
holding out for the higher LUE payoff.  The implication is that any player could be 
reasonably certain of getting at least the lower LUE payoff by waiting until late in 
the game before conceding.  Thus, a player who accepted the lower payoff early in 
the interaction passed up the chance of getting the higher payoff as a result of a 
concession by her opponent.21  
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 In a game with spatial cues, an unfavored player might use Schelling’s backward-induction reasoning and conclude 
that her favored opponent would hold out to the end of the game.  But this argument cannot explain the frequency of early 
agreements in spatially neutral games. 
B.  The Time Path of Claims 
Further insight into the dynamics of bargaining can be gained by looking at the 
evolution of players’ claims prior to the sealing of agreements.  The relevant data 
are provided in the Online Appendix.  These data reveal a striking regularity across 
all games with two unequal LUE allocations: during the second phase of play, the 
value of the claims made by players who had not yet agreed converged to the higher 
LUE payoff.  For example, at 60s in G13 (= 2, 1, 2, 1| |2, 2, 1), 19 pairs had not yet 
agreed; 10 of the unfavored players and 13 of the favored players were claiming 
discs worth exactly £6.  At 60s in G29 (= 5| |5, 5), 57 pairs had not yet agreed; 50 
of the unfavored players and 49 of the favored players were claiming discs worth 
exactly £10. 
It is clear from this regularity that, for most players who reached the final phase 
of play, that phase was essentially a game of Chicken.  The first player to back 
down took the lower LUE payoff, allowing the other player to take the higher 
payoff.  If neither had backed down when the deadline was reached, the payoff was 
zero for both.  Notice the implication that, until the moment at which one player 
backed down, the two players were typically making claims of equal value, even if 
spatial cues favored one player relative to the other.  Thus, if asymmetric spatial 
cues had any effect on agreements reached in the final phase, that effect would not 
be visible in players’ claims in the run-up to the moment of agreement. 
C.  Comparisons between Early and Late Agreements 
In the light of the regularities described in the previous subsections, it is natural 
to ask whether there were systematic differences between early and late 
agreements.  To address this question, we divide our data into two categories – 
early agreement interactions and deadline interactions.  Early agreement 
interactions are those in which an agreement was sealed in the first 60s; anything 
else is a deadline interaction.  In the Online Appendix, we present the content of 
Tables 2a and 2b separately for the two kinds of interaction. 
This disaggregation shows that inequality in final payoffs was mainly confined 
to early agreements.  Recall that there are fourteen cases (identified in Sections 
IV.B and IV.C) in which spatial cues pick out efficient but unequal allocations.  For 
early agreement interactions, NPA is positive in twelve of the fourteen cases, and 
the asymmetry is significant in eight of these (p < 0.10 for eight cases, p < 0.05 for 
six, p < 0.01 for four).  For deadline interactions, NPA is positive in only nine of 
the fourteen cases, and the asymmetry is significant in only one (albeit with p < 
0.01.) 
This disaggregation reveals a further interesting regularity.  Recall that 
interactions resulting in inefficient LIE allocations with nonzero payoffs were rare, 
and almost wholly confined to the three-disc games G19–G30.  Comparatively, 
however, such outcomes were much more common in early agreement interactions 
than in deadline interactions.  Summing over all early agreement interactions in 
G19–G30, there were 64 LIE allocations and 350 LUE allocations (a ratio of 1 to 
5.5).  The corresponding numbers for deadline interactions were 32 and 454 (a ratio 
of 1 to 14.2).  
D.  The Advantage Conferred by Early Claims 
One might conjecture that players who are quicker at making claims in the first 
few seconds gain an advantage over their opponents.22  We investigate this 
possibility by looking at the value of the discs that had been claimed by each player 
5s after the start of the game, excluding cases in which an agreement had already 
been sealed at that time.  The value of the discs claimed by player L at 5s minus the 
 
22
 This idea was suggested to us by an anonymous referee. 
value of the discs claimed by R at 5s provides a measure of the early claim 
advantage of L relative to R.  By comparing this with the payoff difference in favor 
of L (that is, the final payoff to L minus the final payoff to R), we can ask whether 
players with a positive early claim advantage tended to achieve higher payoffs than 
their co-players.  However, in games with spatial cues, this comparison is subject 
to a potential confound.  If players’ first claims are of the discs closest to their bases, 
positive correlation between early claim advantage and final payoff asymmetry 
might indicate the effects of a common causal factor – the spatial layout of the 
discs.  This problem can be avoided by confining the analysis to spatially neutral 
games.  Regressing payoff difference in spatially neutral games against early claim 
advantage, we find a highly significant relationship (p < 0.001) with a coefficient 
of 0.19 (implying that an early claim advantage of £1 generates a payoff difference 
of £0.19).23 
However, if data from early agreement interactions are excluded from this 
regression, the relationship between payoff difference and early claim advantage is 
much weaker, with a much smaller coefficient (0.08), which is only marginally 
significant (p = 0.087).  The implication is that early claim advantage had relatively 
little effect in the final phase of play.  This perhaps reflects the fact that, as noted 
in Section V.B, that phase typically began with both players maintaining claims 
with the same total value.  In other words, any facts on the ground created by either 
player’s early claim advantage had typically been erased before the final phase of 
play. 
 
23
 We use random-effects GLS regressions, clustering at the level of the four-subject group.  We pool the data from all 
spatially neutral games in Sets I and II.  We exclude cases in which pairs failed to reach agreement.  (In such cases, payoff 
difference is necessarily zero.)  Further details of these regressions are provided in the Online Appendix.  
 
E.  Group Heterogeneity 
In the light of the results we have reported so far, it would be interesting to know 
whether there was heterogeneity in players’ hawkishness – that is, the strength of 
their inclination to hold out for larger payoffs – and in their spatial awareness – 
that is, their susceptibility to the effects of spatial cues.  In principle, these are 
individual-level characteristics.  However, the dynamic and interactive features of 
our bargaining table games make it very difficult to isolate characteristics of 
strategies at this level. 
At first sight, it might seem that one could use some definition of players’ ‘initial’ 
claims, and then treat those claims as if the two players had made them 
independently.  But in our bargaining protocol, players could build up claims in a 
gradual fashion, so any notion of initial claims would be arbitrary.  Many 
interactions ended in agreement within the first 10s, but in other cases players built 
up their claims gradually during the first phase of the game, presumably in 
awareness of their opponents’ current claims.  A further complication is that many 
pairs of players seemed to use the making and cancelling of claims as a flexible 
language for exchanging messages.  Another possible approach would be to focus 
on players’ claims in the middle phase of the game, when the rate of agreement was 
lowest.  But, as explained in Section V.B, claims in this phase showed little 
heterogeneity. 
We suggest that the cleanest approach to the investigation of heterogeneity is to 
use matching groups as the unit of observation.  Because of sampling variation in 
the formation of groups, one might expect heterogeneity at the individual level to 
induce some degree of heterogeneity at the group level.  For each matching group 
and for each of the eighteen games, we consider the number of agreements sealed 
by 60s (an index of dovishness, i.e. the converse of hawkishness), and the number 
of interactions ending with the (0, 0) allocation (an index of hawkishness).  For 
games with spatial cues, we also consider NPA (an index of spatial awareness).  
Using Kruskal-Wallis tests, we find strongly significant differences for the first two 
variables in both Set I and Set II, indicating substantial heterogeneity in 
hawkishness, but we find no evidence of heterogeneity in spatial awareness.  
F.  Learning 
So far, we have discussed our results as if each of the eighteen games were played 
in isolation.  One might ask whether there were any systematic changes in behavior 
over the sequence of games played by each subject that could be relevant for the 
interpretation of our results.  In fact, there were no strong effects of this kind. 
Recall that, in each experimental session, games were presented in random order.  
Thus, for any given game, we can compare the behavior of pairs who faced it in the 
first half of the relevant session (that is, as one of the first nine games they played) 
with that of pairs who faced it in the second half.  We make such comparisons in 
respect of average efficiency, NPA (for games in which spatial cues suggest an 
unequal allocation), and bargaining duration.  We find few cases of significant 
differences in efficiency between the two halves of either Set I or Set II sessions, 
and no overall pattern of increase or decrease.  There is some evidence that NPA 
increased over the course of Set I sessions, suggesting that subjects were learning 
to make use of spatial cues, but there seems to be no trend (in either direction) in 
Set II sessions.  Cumulative distributions of bargaining duration are sometimes 
significantly different between the first and second halves of sessions, but there is 
no overall pattern of increasing or decreasing duration.  However, there seems to 
be some tendency for bargaining duration to increase in games in which the LUE 
allocation is very unequal (particularly in G28–G30), suggesting that subjects were 
learning to be more hawkish in such games.  
G.  Summary 
The key to many of the regularities that we have described in this Section is the 
distinction between early agreement and deadline interactions in games in which 
there are two unequal LUE allocations.  We conjecture that two different modes of 
bargaining may have been at work in these games. 
 In the first 60s of play of these games, between 30 and 85 per cent of pairs 
reached agreement, and these agreements were concentrated in the first 30s.  In 
most such agreements, one player accepted the lower LUE payoff and allowed the 
other player to take the higher payoff; in a small minority of cases, both players 
took the lower LUE payoff and some surplus was lost.  This seems to indicate a 
dovish mode of bargaining – that is, a disinclination to contest for the larger share 
of the surplus – on the part of those players who accepted the lower LUE payoff 
early in the game.  In contrast, the final 30s of play seem to be best characterized 
as a contest between two hawkish players, both of whom were holding out for the 
higher payoff, postponing concession as long as they dared.  Since the proportion 
of early agreement interactions is inversely related to the inequality of the LUE 
allocation, we know that subjects cannot be partitioned into unconditional hawks 
and unconditional doves.  But the heterogeneity of hawkishness at the group level 
suggests some underlying heterogeneity at the individual level.  The fact that the 
main effects of payoff-irrelevant cues were on early agreement interactions 
suggests, contrary to Schelling’s ‘midnight bell’ intuition, that those effects were 
mediated by the bargaining strategies of the more dovish players. 
VI. An Alternative Implementation of Spatial Neutrality 
In our main treatment, we have assessed the power of spatial cues using ‘spatially 
neutral’ games as controls.  Recall that in these games, discs are located on a 
bargaining table on which each player has a ‘base’; neutrality is implemented by 
making every disc equidistant from the two bases.  An alternative way of 
implementing spatial neutrality would be to remove the bases altogether.24  As a 
check on the robustness of our findings, we ran a control treatment in which 
bargaining tables were displayed without bases.  This treatment is described in 
detail in the Online Appendix.  Here we present only a brief summary. 
In the control treatment, each of 92 subjects played 30 games in pairs formed 
using the same matching protocol as in the main treatment.  The games were 
identical to G1–G30 in all respects except the following.  First, the two bases on 
each bargaining table were removed.  Second, the table was not rotated.  Thus, both 
players saw the table in the orientation shown in Figure 1, rather than with the 
player’s own base at the bottom.  Third, since there were no bases, players’ claims 
at each moment were shown only by the colors of the discs.  Except for the fact that 
there were 30 games rather than eighteen, the control treatment was organized in 
exactly the same way as the main treatment.  Subjects were recruited in the same 
way from the same pool.  No individual participated in both treatments. 
We found almost no significant differences in players’ behavior between games 
with the same disc collection but different disc locations.  The same is true for 
comparisons of average efficiency, of the percentage of LUE allocations, and of 
bargaining duration.  In other words, in the absence of bases, players took no 
account of the spatial layout of the discs.  The implication is that the ‘no bases’ 
displays lacked salient spatial cues that the players could use in bargaining. 
To test whether the same was true of the spatially neutral games used in the main 
treatment, we compare behavior between those games and the corresponding games 
in the control treatment.  On each of the three dimensions of comparison, we found 
 
24
 This control was suggested by an anonymous referee who conjectured that the generally low disagreement rates for 
the Set I games in the main treatment might be explained by spatial properties of the bargaining table.  In the light of the later 
Set II data, we suggest that the low disagreement rates in G1–G4 and G7–G18 result from the feasibility of EE or only 
slightly unequal LUE allocations in those games.  
almost no significant differences.25  Our interpretation is that spatially neutral 
displays with bases do indeed eliminate salient spatial cues that can be used in 
bargaining.    
However, the fact that the two different methods of implementing spatial 
neutrality corroborate one another has useful implications for the design of 
bargaining experiments.  The bargaining table design provides a simple, easily-
understood and relatively unstructured representation of bargaining problems.  It 
allows very quick exchanges of non-binding and standardized messages that 
participants can easily grasp and that are easy for the experimenter to code and 
analyze.  It seems that if one is not specifically investigating the effect of spatial 
cues, the design can be made even simpler by removing the bases and positioning 
the discs randomly or arbitrarily. 
VII. Trade-offs between Efficiency and Equality 
Taken together, our results show a clear pattern in players’ responses to trade-
offs between efficiency and equality.  In all the bargaining games we investigated, 
there was a strong tendency for players to settle on LUE allocations.  This tendency 
was found even if equal but inefficient allocations were feasible, and even if spatial 
cues suggested non-LUE allocations.  In this Section, we comment on this 
tendency.  The role of spatial cues will be discussed in the Conclusion. 
Our subjects’ reluctance to settle on equal but inefficient allocations when 
efficient but unequal allocations were possible may seem surprising, given the large 
body of experimental evidence that suggests that people are typically inequality 
averse.  Of course, our finding must be interpreted in relation to the constraints that 
the bargaining table design imposes on efficiency/equality trade-offs.  Recall that 
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 Since there are ten spatially neutral games, ten comparisons can be made on each of the three dimensions.  We found 
significant differences in only two of these comparisons.  (G11 had lower average efficiency and a lower percentage of LUE 
agreements in the control treatment than in the main treatment.) 
if the LUE allocations are denoted by (x, y) and (y, x) and the LIE allocation by (z, 
z), the design necessitates z  min(x, y).  Nevertheless, the preponderance of LUE 
allocations in cases such as x = 7, y = 4, z = 4 (games G25–G27) and x = 10, y = 5, 
z = 5 (games G28–G30) suggests a lack of concern by subjects about inequality.  If 
subjects were averse to disadvantageous inequality, as hypothesized by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), player L in such a game would 
prefer (z, z) to (y, x), and player R would prefer (z, z) to (x, y).  Thus, (z, z) would 
be non-dominated in utility, and its equality of money payoffs might be expected 
to make it salient as a potential bargaining outcome. 
It may be relevant that much of the evidence for inequality aversion comes from 
ultimatum games, dictator games, trust games and social dilemmas, which are quite 
different from our games.  We conjecture that the framing and protocol of our 
experimental games may have prompted affective responses and modes of 
reasoning that are characteristic of real bargaining behavior and may have reduced 
the salience of considerations of fairness and equality. 
Another important feature of our design is that, apart from the spatial locations 
of discs relative to bases, the positions of the two players are completely 
symmetrical.  There is no predetermined order of moves, as in ultimatum games.  
Each disc has the same value to both players, and the rules of the game give each 
player the same opportunity to claim it.  Thus, if the outcome of the game is 
unequal, its inequality may seem less objectionable because it has been reached by 
a procedure that respects equality of opportunity.  This form of equality is 
particularly salient when, as was often the case in our experiment, the final stage of 
an interaction is a Chicken game in which the players maintain conflicting LUE 
claims as long as they individually dare.  The hypothesis that people are more 
tolerant of ex post inequality if it is the result of a fair procedure has been proposed 
before, but fairness has usually been understood in terms of players’ intentions (e.g. 
Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher, 2003; Gary E. Bolton, Jordi Brandts 
and Axel Ockenfels, 2005).  We suggest that procedural fairness in our bargaining 
games is a property, not of individuals’ attitudes to one another’s payoffs or 
intentions, but of the rules of the game they are playing.26 
VIII. Conclusion 
The main objective of our experiment was to answer a question that has remained 
open for over 50 years:  Are the outcomes of explicit bargaining games influenced 
by payoff-irrelevant cues, as Schelling (1960) hypothesized?  Our bargaining table 
design allowed us to set up explicit bargaining games into which payoff-irrelevant 
spatial cues could be introduced in an apparently natural way.  The cues we used 
were known to influence behavior in pure coordination and tacit bargaining games.  
Our experiment tested the power of those cues relative to that of payoff-based 
principles of efficiency and equality, when players were able to communicate with 
one another over time and to propose and accept binding agreements.  
We found no evidence that spatial cues were effective in opposition to principles 
of efficiency and equality.  There was a very consistent tendency for players to 
agree to allocations that were efficient and minimally unequal, even if spatial cues 
picked out other allocations – whether those other allocations were equal but 
inefficient, or efficient but less than minimally unequal.  Nevertheless, spatial cues 
had some influence on players’ payoffs.  In games in which efficiency could be 
achieved only at the cost of an asymmetry in payoffs, players faced the problem of 
coordinating on which of them would take the larger share of the available surplus.  
In such games, payoff-irrelevant cues that favored one player relative to the other 
 
26
 This conjecture about the effect of procedural fairness is consistent with a piece of evidence from the explicit 
bargaining experiment reported by Herreiner and Puppe (2010).  In the game with the most severe efficiency/equality trade-
off (‘R3’), the least-unequal Pareto-efficient allocations were (66, 40) and (46, 75); the equal allocation with highest payoffs 
was (45, 45).  Out of 48 pairs of co-players, 22 settled on (45, 45) and 19 on (46, 75), suggesting a greater willingness to 
sacrifice efficiency for equality than in our experiment.  In Herreiner and Puppe’s experiment, unlike ours, players’ payoff 
opportunities were not symmetrical. 
 
tended to skew the outcome of the game to the advantage of the former.  In this 
respect, our results give qualified support to Schelling’s hypothesis. 
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FIGURE 1 – THE GAMES USED IN THE MAIN TREATMENT 
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 FIGURE 2A – CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF AGREEMENT TIMES FOR SET I IN MAIN TREATMENT 
(GAMES WITH COMMON DISC COLLECTIONS POOLED) 
  
 FIGURE 2B – CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF AGREEMENT TIMES FOR SET II IN MAIN TREATMENT 
(GAMES WITH COMMON DISC COLLECTIONS POOLED) 
TABLE 1 – SUMMARY OF THE GAMES USED IN THE EXPERIMENT 
Disc collection LUE LIE Spatially neutral 
Spatial cues pick out: 
EE LUE, not equal Efficient, not LUE LIE, not efficient 
{5,5} (5,5) (5,5) (5,5) G1 = |5,5| G2 = 5| |5 - - - 
{1,2,2,2,2,1} (5,5) (5,5) (5,5) G7 = |1,2,2,2,2,1| G8 = 2,2,1| |1,2,2 - 
G9 = 2,1,1| |2,2,2   
G10 = 2,1| |1,2,2,2 
- 
{5,6} (5,6) (6,5) (0,0) G3 = |5,6| - G4 = 6| |5 - - 
{5,1,5} (5,6) (6,5) (5,5) G19 = |5,1,5| - G20 = 1,5| |5 - G21 = 5|1|5 
{4,2,1,4} (5,6) (6,5) (4,4) G15 = |4,2,1,4| - G17 = 2,4| |4,1 G18 = 2,1| |4,4 G16 = 4|2,1|4 
{1,2,2,2,2,2,1} (5,6) (6,5) (5,5) G11 = |1,2,2,1,2,2,1| - G13 = 2,1,2,1| |1,2,2 G14 = 2,2,2,2| |1,1,1 G12 = 2,1,2|1|2,2,1  
{4,2,4} (4,6) (6,4) (4,4) G22 = |4,2,4| - G23 = 4| |4,2 - G24 = 4|2|4 
{4,3,4} (4,7) (7,4) (4,4) G25 = |4,3,4| - G26 = 3,4| |4 - G27 = 4|3|4 
{3,8} (3,8) (8,3) (0,0) G5 = |3,8| - G6 = 8| |3 - - 
{5,5,5} (5,10) (10,5) (5,5) G28 = |5,5,5| - G29 = 5| |5,5 - G30 = 5|5|5 
 
 
TABLE 2A – RESULTS FOR SET I IN MAIN TREATMENT 
Game description 
Average 
Efficiency  
Percent 
Efficient 
Percent 
Equal  
Percent 
LUE 
Percent SC    
(SC claims) 
Percent 
Disag. (expl.) 
NPAa,b 
G1 = |5,5| 0.986 98.6 98.6 98.6 - 1.4 (0) - 
G2 = 5| |5 0.986 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.6 (84.7) 1.4 (1.4) - 
G3 = |5,6| 0.958 95.8 - 94.4 - 4.2 (1.4) - 
G4 = 6| |5 0.972 97.2 - 97.2 58.3 (58.3) 2.8 (1.4) 0.194* 
G5 = |3,8| 0.802 79.2 - 79.2 - 19.4 (2.8) - 
G6 = 8| |3 0.760 75.0 - 73.6 38.9 (38.9) 23.6 (6.9) 0.033 
G7 = |1,2,2,2,2,1| 0.983 97.2 87.5 87.5 - 1.4 (0) - 
G8 = 2,2,1| |1,2,2 0.981 94.4 87.5 87.5 87.5 (70.8) 1.4 (0) - 
G9 = 2,1,1| |2,2,2 0.958 95.8 79.2 79.2 12.5 (9.7) 4.2 (0) 0.125** 
G10 = 2,1| |1,2,2,2 0.983 95.8 81.9 81.9 0 (0) 1.4 (0) 0.035 
G11 = |1,2,2,1,2,2,1| 0.984 97.2 0.0 95.8 - 1.4 (0) - 
G12 = 2,1,2|1|2,2,1  0.986 98.6 0.0 94.4 0 (0) 1.4 (0) - 
G13 = 2,1,2,1| |2,2,1 0.943 93.1 1.4 88.9 51.4 (38.9) 5.6 (0) 0.097 
G14 = 2,2,2,2| |1,1,1 0.915 90.3 1.4 87.5 0 (0) 8.3 (1.4) 0.036* 
G15 = |4,2,1,4| 0.971 95.8 0.0 94.4 - 2.8 (2.8) - 
G16 = 4|2,1|4 0.944 94.4 0.0 87.5 0 (0) 5.6 (2.8) - 
G17 = 2,4| |4,1 0.957 94.4 0.0 93.1 68.1 (63.9) 4.2 (0) 0.528*** 
G18 = 2,1| |4,4 0.956 94.4 0.0 94.4 0 (0) 4.2 (0) 0.047** 
Notes: 
a – Normalized payoff asymmetry, NPA = (wF - wU) / (wF* - wU*); where wF and wU are means of actual earnings 
of favored and unfavored players respectively, wF* and wU* are earnings of favored and unfavored players in the 
SC allocation. 
b - Significance level in 1-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank test of comparison of payoffs to favored and to unfavored 
players averaging within matching groups: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.  
TABLE 2B – RESULTS FOR SET II IN MAIN TREATMENT 
Game description 
Average 
Efficiency  
Percent 
Efficient 
Percent 
Equal  
Percent 
LUE 
Percent SC      
(SC claims) 
Percent 
Disag. (expl.) 
NPAa,b 
G1 = |5,5| 1.000 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 0 (0) - 
G2 = 5| |5 1.000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 (88.1) 0 (0) - 
G3 = |5,6| 0.976 97.6 - 97.6 - 2.4 (0) - 
G4 = 6| |5 0.964 96.4 - 96.4 69 (69) 3.6 (1.2) 0.417*** 
G5 = |3,8| 0.782 77.4 - 77.4 - 21.4 (3.6) - 
G6 = 8| |3 0.759 75.0 - 75.0 42.9 (42.9) 23.8 (6) 0.088 
G19 = |5,1,5| 0.968 88.1 9.5 86.9 - 2.4 (1.2) - 
G20 = 1,5| |5 0.958 89.3 7.1 86.9 48.8 (41.7) 3.6 (2.4) -0.107 
G21 = 5|1|5 0.962 86.9 9.5 86.9 9.5 (7.1) 2.4 (1.2) - 
G22 = |4,2,4| 0.886 76.2 15.5 76.2 - 8.3 (2.4) - 
G23 = 4| |4,2 0.888 77.4 14.3 76.2 44 (38.1) 8.3 (1.2) 0.083 
G24 = 4|2|4 0.867 76.2 13.1 76.2 13.1 (11.9) 10.7 (4.8) - 
G25 = |4,3,4| 0.838 78.6 7.1 78.6 - 14.3 (1.2) - 
G26 = 3,4| |4 0.872 82.1 6.0 78.6 51.2 (46.4) 10.7 (4.8) 0.214** 
G27 = 4|3|4 0.805 76.2 6.0 75.0 6 (6) 17.9 (1.2) - 
G28 = |5,5,5| 0.802 76.2 6.0 76.2 - 17.9 (4.8) - 
G29 = 5| |5,5 0.885 82.1 9.5 82.1 34.5 (32.1) 8.3 (2.4) -0.131 
G30 = 5|5|5 0.845 77.4 10.7 77.4 10.7 (4.8) 11.9 (4.8) - 
Notes: 
a – Normalized payoff asymmetry, NPA = (wF - wU) / (wF* - wU*); where wF and wU are means of actual earnings 
of favored and unfavored players respectively, wF* and wU* are earnings of favored and unfavored players in the 
SC allocation. 
b - Significance level in 1-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank test of comparison of payoffs to favored and to unfavored 
players averaging within matching groups: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent. 
